C
ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees (PACs) are increasingly important-and controversial-in U.S. elections. "Influence purchasing" is often alleged by pundits, and campaign finance reform is continually debated in Congress. In the academy, social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation. Few, however, have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups. We shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit-maximizing behavior. We assume that corporate PAC contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives. Our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986.
Both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries. We argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output, by government's ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions, and by the industry's ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance. The costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems, because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry.
We also make a methodological contribution. Previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken. We explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems. The results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment-oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake, and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity. We can explain between 60% and 80% of the variation in contributions in our sample.
First, we review existing work on corporate political activity, particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate PAC spending by industry. Then we present an organization-cost-constrained industryprofit-maximizing model, based on a comparison between an idealized zero-organization-cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult. The independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined. Next, we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method. Then the results are presented, followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity. To make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns, we give examples using five actual industries. Siegfried 1977; Stratmann 1991; Wright 1989 Wright , 1990 ). Research on specific policies finds some measurable effects. Work on broader measures of influence (e.g., general voting patterns and behavior) finds negligible impacts. ' Turning to the sources of money, Andres (1985) , Masters and Keim (1985) , Grier, Munger, and Roberts (1991), Humphries (1991) , and McKeown (1994) all study a binary choice: Does a corporation have a PAC?2 This question is important, but if we are really to understand the pattern of political action of industries we must focus on the amounts that industries contribute as a collection of firms. Unfortunately, the work on total contributions (our dependent variable of interest) has focused on industry structure (particularly concentration) rather than offering a general model.3 Pittman (1976) argues that more contributions will be generated by concentrated industries (i.e., a few large firms). Esty and Caves (1982) and Zardkoohi (1985) find ambiguous effects for industry structure. None of these models has worked from an overarching conception of the goals of the firm and the industry and how these goals might be realized through political action.
The data that previous researchers use also vary widely. Pittman (1976) Though each of these papers makes a useful contribution, they each have problems in research design. The first kind of problem is the choice of a sample to analyze. Pittman, Zardkoohi, and Esty and Caves all consider only industries (in Zardkoohi's case, firms) that are politically active. Though this does allow the use of least squares estimation, using only active PACs is clearly a nonrandom criterion for inclusion in the sample. As Heckman (1976 Heckman ( , 1979 shows, if variables, that determine the sample are correlated with variables used to test hypotheses in the sample, ordinary least squares coefficient estimates are biased and inconsistent. It is quite likely that variables influencing whether firms in an industry establish a PAC correlate with variables affecting how much money that PAC then spends. (We show later that this is exactly the case.) Boies's sample includes noncontributing firms, but he chooses his specification with ordinary least squares and then reestimates the "best" model using TOBIT.4 TOBIT regressions force the model for predicting existence of PACs, and the model predicting the spending of PACs, to have the same set of coefficients (see Appendix A).
The second research design problem is the size of the samples used in these studies. Esty and Caves study 300 firms aggregated into just 35 industry-level observations. Zardkoohi and Boies consider 415 and 500 firms respectively. Pittman does not report the number of industries included in his sample. Further, each paper analyzes only one or two cross sections of contributions. In cases where more than one cross section is examined, regressions are run separately, with no attempt to exploit the time-series property of the data for increased efficiency of coefficient estimates.
We address these research design issues in our empirical work, aggregating thousands of firms into 124 different industries, over five election cycles. We test for, and then reject, the implicit restrictions built into the TOBIT model. The alternate technique first proposed by Heckman (1976) is shown to be a better means of accounting for sample selection.
INVESTMENT IN POLITICAL ACTION BY INDUSTRY
It will be useful to lay out the theoretical perspective that informs the subsequent empirical work.
Theoretical Perspective
The following model captures variations in the likely gains to political action and the costs in achieving those gains, across industries. The maintained hypothesis underlying our work is that in a world of no organization costs, industries would maximize total profits earned by all producers. But as Olson (1965) points out, groups that might form profitably may be prevented from doing so by the free-rider problem. Consequently, the explanatory variables we shall discuss are mostly controls for obstacles to collective action.
We shall analyze corporate PACs as if they were directly controlled by their sponsors in cooperation with other corporations in the industry, to see how much explanatory power this reductionist approach has. Under the assumption that there are no impediments to agreeing on or enforcing collective action, industries would achieve the joint profit maximum. In this idealized setting, we can write the following profit function for industry i:5 H1i = Pi(Qi, Ii)Qi(Li, Ki) -ri(Ii, Ki)Ki -w~li., Li)Li -OI(O)i.,
where II = joint industry profits; P = price of output for whole industry (no cheating), partly politically determined; Q = quantity of output produced, given production technology and amounts of K and L; I = political influence of the industry, an industry-specific function of 4;6 L = quantity of labor used for We assume that labor and capital markets are segmented and that the industry can affect P, r, and w through government influence.7 For example, the auto industry can affect P by supporting protectionist legislation, w by gaining power over unions, and r through regulation of financial markets and monetary policy. We must account for an important additional factor to make the model useful for application to actual corporate political activity. The industries with the lowest costs (in terms of acting collectively) of using political action are also the industries for which political action holds the lowest marginal benefits. Industries that can act as a unit are quite likely able to achieve most benefits of cartelization on their own. As Posner points out: "The demand for regulation ... is greater among industries for which private cartelization is an unfeasible or very costly alternative-industries that lack high concentration and other characteristics favorable to cartelizing. They lack good substitutes for regulation" (1974, 345). Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off. If the industry can act perfectly collusively, privately, it can charge PJPM and achieve the private, joint profit maximum. Political influence might increase profits further, by protecting the industry's output for competition, increasing government purchases, or making cheaper loans or labor contracts available. But these gains may be smaller than the potential gains of more competitive industries: the cost of increasing profits rises as the industry nears the joint profit maximum (Denzau and Munger 1986; Peltzman 1976) .
A purely noncooperative industry, with no private collective agreement on price and output, charges price equal to marginal cost (the flat line in Figure 1 ) and makes zero economic profits. This industry serves a similar market to-and faces the same input costs as-the joint profit-maximizing industry discussed above, but II = 0, because of collective action problems. The benefits to political action for a competitive industry are large, but the costs of overcoming the collective action problem if firms are atomistic are larger still. Finally, the "intermediate" industry charges PINT Political action is more costly for intermediate industries than for perfectly organized industries, but the benefits are far larger than for privately colluding groups because intermediate industries cannot reach PJPM on their own.
To summarize, we claim that if the marginal costs and benefits of political activity are accounted for, the pattern of contributions can be explained. The null hypothesis against which our theory is tested is that corporate PAC contributions by an industry are explained by idiosyncratic internal imperatives, not external investment-oriented goals. (Grenzke 1989; Wright 1985) or work that has mixed trade association and corporate PACs (Wright 1989 (Wright , 1990 ) is useful as research on interest groups generally but tells us little about the general pattern of corporate political action. Corporate PAC contributions at the industry level are important in their own right, for at least three reasons.
First, trade associations are subject to the statutory limit of $10,000 per election cycle (primary and general) per candidate, while PACs representing individual corporations in the same industry can make many contributions of up to $10,000. Consequently, trade associations often represent groups with many diffuse members. For example, in 1988, the National Association of Realtors spent $3 million, the American Medical Association $2.7 million, and the Association of Trial Lawyers $1.9 million. Trade associations are less important in industries with a few large firms, however: the "motor vehicles and equipment" industry gave more than $1.8 million, with just the Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors PACs spending $1.2 million. Second, collective action by corporations is a substantive and interesting problem in its own right. Umbrella organizations such as trade associations are one means by which collective action problems can be overcome, but only because the costs of organizing and raising funds are internalized. We address collective action directly, by explaining differences in industries' ability to overcome free-rider problems and induce corporations to act. Finally, government actions often affect the entire industry. The Environmental Protection Agency regulates use of chemicals by dry-cleaning firms, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration requires all autos to meet safety standards, and an increase in the oil depletion allowance affects the net profits of all oil producers. Firms that can act as an industry will be much more effective at deflecting or diluting unfavorable regulation.8 Since the pattern of contributions observed just one firm at a time could be consistent with either pure cooperation or purely atomistic behavior, we use the industry as the unit of analysis.
Definition of Industry
The intuitive definition of an industry is just "all firms that produce similar products." Of course, this requires a definition of similar. The Census of Manufactures has a range of industry definitions, or standard industrial classifications (SICs), from two-digit (very broad) to five-digit (extremely specific). For example, SIC 20 is "food and kindred products," SIC 202 is "dairy products," and SIC 2024 is "ice cream and frozen desserts." Similarly, SIC 50 is "durable goods-wholesale," 504 is "professional and commercial equipment supply-Wholesale," and 5045 is "computers and software-wholesale." We need to use a definition of industry that includes enough observations that the sample can be analyzed statistically yet ensures that the firms we will call an industry produce similar outputs. To strike a balance between these two concerns, we have chosen the three-digit SIC level as the definition of industry.
The variables we propose to use to explain industry political activity will be defined and discussed. These variables are designed to capture the determinants of variations in political activity across industries, that is, the marginal benefits of political action to the industry, the marginal costs of political action to the industry, and the collective action costs faced by the firms in the industry in organizing politically.
Empirical Model
To specify an empirical model embodying these ideas, we shall consider each of three sets of explanations in turn: direct political influences on demand for the industry's output, political influences on underlying market conditions, and the costs of collective action. A brief description of the variables we use to measure these concepts is given here. (For a complete description of the definitions and sources of the variables, see Appendix B.) Direct Political Influence on Demand. The federal government can affect the demand for the industry's output directly by being a consumer and indirectly by being a regulator. The size of average sales to the government and whether the industry is subject to regulation (a dummy variable, equal to 1 for 17 industries in the sample subject to specific federal regulation) are the most important indicators of direct government impact. Our measure of regulated industry is taken from Pittman (1977) . Average government sales is the mean (in millions of dollars) amount of sales by firms in each industry and is taken from Bureau of the Census (1985a-d). These variables represent the degree that prices are determined by a political process and may be sensitive to political influence. Consequently, both regulation and government sales should cause higher contributions.
Amelioration of Adverse Market Conditions. As noted, for an industry to profit from favorable regulation, both its input and output markets should be protected from unexpected shocks and from potential competitors. Government can also indirectly affect both the level and variability of demand for the industry's product and competition from imports. Our measure of variability of demand that the industry faces is standard deviation of industry profits, based on time-series data on real corporate profits (again, in 1988 dollars) provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the two-digit SIC level. The variable used is the standard deviation of profits over the four years preceding each election in the sample. We expect this variable, which measures variations in the riskiness of profits across industries, to be positively associated with political activity. The reason is that risky industries may try to get government either to underwrite their losses (as was the case in the bailout of Chrysler and the savings-and-loan industry) or to pursue policies that will support demand. Examples of the latter include price floors on commodities or the extension of "most favored" trade status to nations with many consumers and many large human rights violations. Import share is a measure of the industry's exposure to foreign competition, which might be moderated by government intervention. Ceteris paribus, industries with higher import shares will use the political process more heavily, at least up to some critical level of imports. The source for import share is Clark, Kaserman, and Mayo 1990.
If the industry uses specialized labor, political influence on Congress and the National Labor Relations Board can affect wages industry by industry. The federal government also influences the riskadjusted price of borrowing funds through management of the money supply, but no good industryspecific measures of interest rates are available. Consequently, our measures of input prices are real wage rate and BAA bond rate. Wage is the annual inflation-adjusted wage rate for production workers in the industry; the data come from the CITIBASE economic data bank. This variable is available only at the two-digit SIC level and only for industries 20-49. Bond rate is available annually and is the average rate charged on BAA-rated bonds as reported by CITIBASE. All else equal, high-wage industries should be more politically active, and all industries should be more politically active in years when interest rates are high.
Collective-Action Problems. Although, for the sake of exposition, we assume that the industry faces no collective-action problems and can achieve the joint profit maximum of a pure cartel, differences in the costs of collective action are the key variables in the choice to seek political influence. There are two general categories of measures to be included: measures of the extent to which the industry has common interests, and measures of the industry's ability to overcome the free-rider problem.
We include two measures of the extent to which the industry has common interests: geographic concentration and diversity of the products that the industry produces and sells. Geographic concentration is a measure of whether an industry has good alternatives to contributions as means of gaining political influence (e.g., lobbying, direct appeals to voters). If an industry is located entirely in a single state, its employees are an important voting bloc for legislators in that state when compared to an industry with the same number of employees spread uniformly over all 50 states. We use a Herfindahl index to measure dispersion of industry sales across states; greater geographic concentration produces a higher index.9 The expected sign for the coefficient on this variable is negative, since votes can substitute for contributions.'0 Diverse industry is a dummy variable selecting heterogeneous industries, in terms of number of different products. The variable equals 1.0 for the 30 industries that have more products than two standard deviations above the mean. To the extent that industries with greater product diversity have weaker common interests among firms, we expect contributions to be lower." Both geographic concentration and diversity are adapted from COMPUSTAT. We account for the ability of the industry to overcome the free-rider problem in three ways: firm size, industry structure, and government reaction to collusive arrangements. The first of these is the most obvious; in Olson's (1965) framework, the key element is the absolute size of benefits to the individual. Since in our analysis the "individual" is the firm, we use average private sales (measured in millions of 1988 dollars) as a measure of firm size. The relative cost of raising funds falls with larger firms, at least over a certain size range. Political action committee money has to be raised from employees in sufficient quantities to have some effect; larger firms have more employees and are better able to pay the fixed start-up and accounting costs for establishing a PAC. The data on mean firm size within industries is from COMPUSTAT.
The industry structure variable is the four-firm concentration ratio (hereafter, concentration). Concentration is the proportion of total industry sales accounted for by the four largest firms (the data used here are from the Bureau of the Census 1985a). In more concentrated industries, the smaller number of similar-sized firms simplifies formation and enforcement of agreements over contribution strategies and raise total contributions, at least over some range. As industries become highly concentrated, firms presumably have sufficient market power to earn maximal profits with less and less political help. Cumulative antitrust indictments measures the ability of the industry to solve problems of collective action privately without attracting attention from the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commissions, which try to ensure private collective action problems stay unsolved. Other factors equal, antitrust actions make firms more sensitive to the political environment and raise contributions. Our measure comes from Miller 1989 and Miller, Shughart, and Tollison 1990.
The variables described above account for several different effects. Industry structure for example, proxies for both the costs and the benefits of political action. Sales to the government measure both the dependence on political action and the existence of direct ties with specific agencies or departments. Our goal has been not to discriminate among theoretical models of political investment (which do not yet exist) but to specify a simple theoretical model con- 
RESULTS
The sample is a pooled time-series cross section, so our first task is to find out whether the time-series pooling assumption is valid. In all the regressions reported here, there is a trend variable (trend = 1 in 1978 and goes up by 1 in each period to 5.0 in the 1986 election) included as a regressor. The variable imposes the restriction that the intercept shifts an equal amount between each election. This restriction can be tested by replacing the trend variable with four dummy variables that let the intercept shift freely and then comparing the fit of the two equations with a likelihood ratio test. In all cases, the appropriateness of the trend variable cannot be rejected, even at the .10 confidence level.
We also test for the stability of the other coefficients in the regression over time using likelihood ratio tests. The hypothesis that a pooled sample is appropriate at the .05 level, once the trend intercept shift is allowed, cannot be rejected. Thus the annual estimates do pool over the years in our sample, and treating these data as a single sample is legitimate.
Equations 1 and 2 carry out the Heckman procedure ( Table 2 ). The PROBIT model from equation 2 provides an estimate of the IMR that is used as an additional regressor in the reported OLS regression. The selectivity-corrected OLS model shows all variables correctly signed and significant at the .01 level except concentration.'2 This regression explains 60% of the variation in contributions across politically active industries. Also, the coefficient on the IMR is positive and significant in equation 3, suggesting that selectivity is a factor in these data. In other words, OLS estimations on this sample would produce biased estimates of the true coefficients. The PROBIT model (equation 1) correctly classifies 80% of the cases in the sample. The misclassified cases are split almost evenly between inactive industries predicted to be making contributions (61 cases) and contributing industries predicted to be inactive (64 cases).
Our technique allows a comparison of the effects of Consider now the rest of the results in equation 2. The significant trend coefficient implies that average industry contributions are increasing about $41,000 per year, after controlling for the effect of our independent variables. Private and government sales both increase contributions at a decreasing rate (i.e., coefficients on squared terms are negative), but the effect of government sales is dramatically larger compared with the results from the earlier method. Fifty million dollars in private sales produces about $10,600 in contributions, while an equal amount of sales to the government is associated with $65,500 of industry PAC money.13 The industries with the most extreme heterogeneity of product lines contribute almost $400,000 less than average. Geographically concentrated industries also contribute significantly less, suggesting that they can use alternate avenues of exercising political influence. Each one-standarddeviation increase in geographic concentration lowers contributions by over $85,000. Finally, industries with greater variability in past profit streams contribute significantly more to political campaigns. Every one-standard-deviation increase in this risk-proxy raises contributions about $40,000.
These results show that the simple organizationally constrained investment model of political activity has considerable explanatory power. We shall add the import, wage, and interest-rate variables to the model and consider the results in more detail. These variables are available only for the 110-industry, 550-observation subsample. Table 3 adds import share, import share squared, real wages, and the BAA bond rate to the regressors from Table 2, with the sample reduced by 14 industries because of missing data. Equations 1 and 2 reestimate the two-equation selectivity model using the original variable set from the previous analysis. The only differences from the Table 2 results are that concentration now significantly affects both contribution levels and the probability of participation, and the coefficient on the square of government sales is now positive and significant. The other variables have the same signs as before and are statistically significant.
Equations 3 and 4 in Table 3 We can use the estimates in equation 4 to describe the effect that changes in the variables have on industry political contributions in this subsample. The average level of private sales in this subsample is 834 (meaning the average firm in the average industry has sales of $834 million), which implies contributions of $142,000. An increase of one standard deviation raises contributions to $397,400, an increase of more than a quarter of a million dollars. The contribution-maximizing level of sales is $9.9 billion (only one sample industry has larger average firm sales), implying $888,000 in contributions.
The average level of government sales is $19 million, which is associated with $29,300 in marginal political contributions. A one-standard-deviation increase in government sales raises predicted contributions to $153,800, an increase of more than 400%. These results suggest that at the margin, having government as a customer increases industry political activity more than having private-sector customers. The hypothesis that the two types of sales have identical effects on contributions can be rejected at the .01 level. Regulation also raises contributions more than $100,000 per election, and every antitrust indictment increases industry contributions by $7,200. This last variable ranges from 0 to 35 in this subsample. Greater government involvement with firms either greatly increases the return to political activity or dramatically lowers the costs of collective action by having politicians readily available to coordinate industry activities.
The effect of industry concentration on contributions is increasing up to 35%, just below the sample mean of 41%. At 35% concentration, predicted marginal contributions are about $132,000. A one-standard-deviation increase above 35% (to 53%) reduces the predicted effect of concentration on contributions to only $99,500. At levels of concentration above 70%, the marginal effect of concentration on contributions is negative.14 Import share also significantly affects industry PAC contributions. At the sample mean penetration of 10.3%, contributions due to imports are predicted to be about $73,000. A one-standard-deviation increase (to 21.6%) in import penetration raises contributions to about $104,000. Beyond the 23% import level, the marginal effect of import competition on industry contributions begins to fall, reaching zero at around 46%.
Industries that pay higher wages also make greater political contributions. Every one-dollar increase in industry wages increases PAC contributions by around $33,000. Every percentage point increase in interest rates raises each industry's contribution about $7,000, though this effect is not strongly significant. In general, however, our prediction that higher input prices increase political activity is strongly supported in these data.
Geographic concentration is still negative, though only marginally significant in this sample. Each onestandard-deviation increase in geographic concentration lowers contributions about $26,000. The diverse industry dummy is still negative and significant, with a coefficient of -$168,000. These results continue to show the importance of organizational factors on industry political activities.
Finally, the coefficient on the IMR is still positive and significant, showing the importance of our technique's correction for sample selection bias. The general fit of the model is quite good. The R-squared of .79 in the contribution equations means that we are explaining about 80% of the variation in contributions across both industries and time. The PROBIT model predicting the existence of political activity correctly classifies 81% of the 550 cases in the sample. Industry political activity can be explained quite well with a basic model accounting for profit opportunities and free-riding costs.
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES FROM 1986
We shall consider in more detail the contribution patterns of some selected industries. First, Table 4 contains summary statistics on the independent variables grouped by amount of contributions in 1986 into four categories: no contributions (40 cases), positive contributions less than $100,000 (45 cases), contributions between $100,001 and $500,000 (23 cases), and contributions greater than $500,000 (16 cases make few contributions and low-wage industries that make large ones. Second, we provide five examples of how our model works to predict industry contributions in Table 5 . We examine the predicted contributions for the cigarette, aircraft, motor vehicle, trucking, and petroleum-refining industries made by equation 4 in Table 3 ; that is, the entries give the dollar amount of predicted contributions attributed to each individual independent variable. That number is expressed in thousands of 1988 dollars and is computed by multiplying the value of each variable for each industry by the relevant regression coefficient. We have rounded off the figures to the nearest thousand dollars.
In the cigarette industry ( Note: The technique of using specific industries as examples is drawn from Bartels (1991). The predictions here come from the coefficients estimated earlier in Model 4, Table 3 . aSum of those effects that do not vary cross-sectionally and are therefore fixed for all industries. These include intercept, trend, and interest rate variable. bIn this case, the value of the IMR is large enough to raise the predicted contribution significantly ($13,000) above what the reported variables predict, an indication of the importance of what would otherwise be selectivity bias in the estimation procedure.
sales account for $877,000, concentration for -$126,000, and geographic concentration for -$90,000. The aircraft industry, contributed $2,486,000 in 1986, while our model's predicted contribution is 2,523,000. Here, sales to the government is the driving factor, accounting for over 2 million dollars in campaign contributions. Note that neither of these industries is significantly regulated by Pittman's 1977 standards. The third industry in Table 5 is motor vehicles, or SIC category 371 (vehicle bodies assembly, not final sales). Actual 1986 contributions by this industry are $1,092,000; our predicted contribution is $856,000. In this industry, antitrust trouble and import penetration account for about $280,000 of the total contribution. Sales concentration and geographic concentration offset each other, and government sales explains most of the rest of the prediction. Trucking and courier services is examined in Table 5 , column 4. Regulation, sales concentration and antitrust trouble are the main factors driving our predicted contribution of $374,000. The actual industry total is $402,000. Trucking is geographically dispersed, has low average sales to the government, faces no import competition, and has very small average firm size compared to the other industries in our example. Yet trucking contributions approach those of the cigarette industry.
Finally, consider the petroleum refining industry. Petroleum refiners contributed $2,715,000 in 1986, the largest industry contribution in our data. Our model 11only" predicts a contribution of about $2.1 million. A large average firm size ($870,000) and significant sales to the government ($867,000) are the largest factors affecting contributions here. However, sales concentration, antitrust trouble, import competition, and high wages also have a significant predicted effect. Our $700,000 underprediction may be indirect evidence supporting Evans's claim that "oil PACs [are] the most ideological" of all corporate PACs (1988, 1048). While our simple cost-benefit model does predict a very large contribution, petroleum refiners contributed even more.
The tenacious reader will have noticed that industry wages are associated with large contribution numbers but have received little emphasis in our exposition of Table 5 . That is because there is not much variation in wages across the five chosen industries. Consider a case of two industries similar in many respects but with different average wages. The sawmill industry (SIC 242) contributed $262,000 in 1986, the papermill industry, (SIC 262) $583,000. Both are made up small firms with few sales to the federal government, and neither has much history with the antitrust authorities. Yet there exists (and our model predicts) about a $300,000 difference in their political contributions. Of the difference, $104,000 is due to higher wages in the papermill industry, and another $104,000 is attributed to the fact that papermills are significantly regulated (according to Pittman) and sawmills are not. The rest of the difference is attributed to the greater concentration of the papermill industry.
CONCLUSION
We have investigated the industrial organization of corporate PACs over the period 1978-86. Though the allocation of PAC monies among candidates for political office has been extensively studied, we are the first to present even a simple empirical model of corporate political activity and then investigate which industries contribute and how much they give. Our empirical results support two theoretical propositions: (1) the evidence is consistent with the notion that industries follow investment-oriented goals in political activity, and (2) the ability of industries to achieve these goals is conditioned by both the benefits that political action brings and the costs of achieving cooperation and organizing collective action. Between 60% and 80% of the variation in contributions is explained in the empirical models. Coefficient signs and significance levels are robust, showing general consistency across time, changes in the sample, and inclusion or omission of independent variables. We feel our evidence is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that variations in total PAC contributions are based on idiosyncratic internal goals, at least at the corporate PAC level. Wright's (1985) influential work only directly addresses the behavior of five large trade associations. We argue that attaining real political leverage requires concerted contributions by a group of PACs and therefore study corporate PACs at the industry level. However, it is still an open question whether the factors we use to explain corporate PAC contribution levels can explain total trade association PAC activities. We plan in future work to study the relationships between corporate PACs and industry trade associations.
In closing, one further caveat seems in order. Given that the errors are independently and identically distributed normal, the coefficients of this model can be estimated using maximum likelihood.
As we note in the text, TOBIT models force a single set of coefficients to explain both whether the dependent variable will be observed and its value conditional on being observed. Cragg (1971) points out that it is not obvious that the occurrence of limit observations and the regression model for the observed data should be so closely related. Cragg assumes that the probability of limit observations is independent of the regression model. Greene (1993) shows that this restriction in the TOBIT model can be tested by comparing the fit of the TOBIT model with the combined fit of (1) a PROBIT model predicting the probability of a nonlimit observation and (2) a truncated normal regression on the nonlimit data. (1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986) . If a corporation was not identified as having a PAC, the contributions for that firm were listed as zero; otherwise, the total contributions of the PAC to House candidates were listed. Many PACs were neither identified as having corporate sponsors, nor had an identifiable company name revealed in their registered PAC title. These PACs were dropped from the sample. The firm-level data were then aggregated up to the three-digit SIC industry level, using the SIC codes listed on COMPUSTAT, by adding up all the contributions within an industry.
Average Private Sales. Obtained from COMPUSTAT; item no. 12 on industrial database. Gross sales (the amount of actual billings to customers for regular sales completed during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, and returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers. Value is in millions of dollars and is annual (as are all COMPUSTAT variables). Our variable represents the average of sales over firms in the three-digit industry.
Average Geographic Concentration. The variable is a Herfindahl index, calculated for each industry j as Zi (Salesi /Sales)2, where sales in the ith state are calculated using the COMPUSTAT state IDs for each corporation in the sample, and the denominator of the ratio is total industry j sales.
Industry Profits. The variable is "corporate profits without adjustments" contained in the Bureau of Economic Analysis Income and Wealth Division's gross product originating (GPO) by industry, table 6.1F. These data are annual, available in an industry grouping very similar to the two-digit SIC. We adjusted these data for inflation using industry-specific price indices and gave the appropriate two-digit profit figure to each three-digit industry in the sample.
Diverse Industry. Source data come from COMPUSTAT Industrial Segment File, where the number of segments (roughly, products) are reported by each firm, up to a maximum of 10. We averaged these data by industry (mean = 1.7, standard deviation = .65) and then defined a "diverse industry" as one with mean number of products more than two standard deviations above the sample average; that is, all industries whose firms average more than three product lines are coded 1.0 and the others .00. Variables are "average hourly earnings of production workers" (LE6M2O-LE6M39), corresponding to two-digit SICs. We adjusted for inflation using the gross national product deflator and gave the appropriate two-digit "real wage" figure to each three-digit industry in the sample. 9. The general form of the Herfindahl index is the sum of the squares of some fractions that sum to one. It is widely used to measure market structure-(the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms). In this case, the "share" variable is the proportion of total sales that each state represents for the industry.
10. As Snyder (1989) shows, the issue of optimal dispersion of "power" is a difficult one. The issue depends in part on the ability of a group (e.g., in this case, of employees at manufacturing plants) to control a single district or to spread among several districts. The probability of being pivotal in multiple districts is higher if the workers are spread out; the probability of being pivotal in at least one district is obviously higher if all the workers are in one district. It may not be true, therefore, that geographic diversity has a monotonic effect in either direction.
11. The average number of product lines per industry is 1.7. The cut-off point for being considered a "diverse" industry is 3.0. We ran regressions using product lines directly. In a linear specification, it is negative but insignificant; adding the square turns the linear coefficient positive; and the square coefficient is negative and significant. Since it seems strange to estimate a quadratic function for a variable that ranges from 1 to 4.1, we used the dummy variable described in the text.
12. Standard OLS estimates are inconsistent, and the standard errors are incorrect (see Greene 1993; Heckman 1979 ). The standard errors reported here are corrected, using the procedure Greene derives from Heckman's consistent estimator. All our regressions were estimated with LIMDEP version 5.1 and checked with sHAzAm version 7.0.
13. The average level of sales to the federal government in the full sample is $50 million.
14. These results are broadly similar to those of Grier, Munger, and Roberts (1991), who find that the influence of concentration on the number of PACs in an industry is nonlinear, first increasing and then decreasing, for the year 1984.
